A Lot of People Want the Islamic Regime to Fall. What About Iranians Inside Iran?

This may not be the most accurate comparison, but it is a useful place to begin.

Saying that most Iranians living inside Iran do not support the Islamic Republic can sometimes resemble saying that most North Koreans living inside North Korea do not support their regime.

It might be true.

It might even be overwhelmingly true.

But proving it is another matter.

Iran is not North Korea. Iranians have substantially greater access to the outside world, elections take place, millions use social media and circumvention tools, researchers conduct surveys, and enormous protests have repeatedly erupted across the country.

But Iran is still an authoritarian state where answering political questions can carry consequences, independent polling is extremely difficult, the internet is censored and sometimes shut down, and people living under the system cannot necessarily tell a stranger on the telephone what they really think.

At the same time, much of what Israelis and Westerners hear about what "Iranians" supposedly believe comes from people who do not live in Iran at all.

And once we started looking closely at the numbers, something became clear.

We know that Iran is deeply dissatisfied.

We do not know nearly as confidently what Iran wants instead.

How 80 percent became a fact

One of the most repeated claims about Iran is that roughly 70 to 80 percent of Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic.

There is real research behind that number.

GAMAAN, an independent research foundation based in the Netherlands, has repeatedly surveyed Iranians online using internet circumvention tools. During the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, it asked respondents inside Iran a remarkably straightforward question: "Islamic Republic: Yes or No?"

About 81 percent answered no.

(GAMAAN is an independent Netherlands based research foundation whose polling is widely cited and not known to be institutionally partisan, although its online sampling methodology has drawn legitimate criticism over potential selection bias.)

Later surveys produced lower but still very large anti-regime numbers.

The problem begins when one answer starts being used to answer several different questions.

Would you vote to retain the Islamic Republic?

Do you dislike the government?

Do you want fundamental reform?

Do you want regime change?

Do you want a revolution?

Do you want foreign countries to overthrow the regime?

Those aren't the same question.

Yet the distinctions have repeatedly disappeared.

Benjamin Netanyahu said in 2025 that "80% of the people" wanted to overthrow the regime. In another interview, he said 80 percent of Iranians "despise" their rulers.

Neither statement describes what GAMAAN actually measured.

The inflation became even more striking with another number: 92 percent.

A leaked Iranian survey reportedly found that 92 percent were dissatisfied with the situation in the country.

That subsequently became something very different.

At a Jerusalem Post conference, INSS researcher Beni Sabti described a secret poll as showing that "92% of the Iranian people hate their regime."

The Jerusalem Post and World Israel News later described previous surveys as showing that between 80 and 92 percent of Iranians opposed the regime.

But those figures came from different research asking different questions.

"Dissatisfied with the situation in the country" had quietly become "hate their regime."

This doesn't require a conspiracy.

It requires only repetition.

A researcher publishes a qualified finding. An activist summarizes it. A politician makes it punchier. A headline removes another qualification. Eventually a complicated survey result becomes something everyone simply "knows."

Then we found the surveys that tell a very different story

GAMAAN's latest research remains extraordinary.

Its June 2026 survey included 31,450 respondents living inside Iran. After weighting, its effective sample size was approximately 6,211.

It found 47 percent identifying with regime change as a prerequisite for change and another 23 percent favoring structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic.

Only 10 percent selected gradual reform within the existing system and 9 percent identified with the principles of the Islamic Revolution and Supreme Leader.

That sounds devastating for the regime.

But there is a serious methodological problem.

Approximately 97 percent of respondents received the survey through Psiphon, a tool used to circumvent Iranian internet restrictions.

That is ingenious if you need people to answer sensitive questions anonymously.

It also means you're surveying people using technology specifically designed to circumvent restrictions imposed by the government you're asking them about.

GAMAAN attempts to correct the resulting imbalance by weighting its sample for age, gender, education, urban or rural residence and province.

Critics argue that weighting cannot solve the fundamental problem.

You can make the correct proportion of your respondents rural. You cannot establish that rural Iranians using Psiphon and voluntarily completing a political questionnaire think like rural Iranians who don't.

And 23 percent of GAMAAN's 2026 respondents had previously participated in one of its surveys.

Then there is the counterevidence.

A 2026 study by political scientist Daniel Tavana and colleagues reportedly used an embedded list experiment, a technique designed to reduce the incentive to lie about politically sensitive beliefs.

When respondents were directly asked about support for the Islamic Republic, approximately 57 percent expressed support.

Under the anonymous list experiment, the estimate fell to roughly 47 percent.

That decline is important.

So is the number remaining.

If the study holds up, almost half still supported the Islamic Republic even after researchers attempted to account for fear driven dishonesty.

Another nationally representative 2024 survey reported by political scientist Roya Izadi found only 30 percent favoring regime change. Fifty seven percent preferred gradual reform and 13 percent the status quo.

These results don't merely differ slightly from GAMAAN.

They describe substantially different Irans.

Even Iran's own secret research doesn't settle it

Perhaps internal government research could resolve the argument.

It doesn't.

A confidential report prepared by presidential adviser Ali Rabiei, titled "What Iran Wants," drew upon Iranian research conducted after the enormous upheavals of 2026.

Only 9 percent reportedly wanted things to remain as they were.

Around 53 percent wanted fundamental reforms and more than 19 percent wanted the political system changed outright.

Opposition media could reasonably look at those numbers and see a society rejecting the status quo.

But Nournews, associated with Iran's national security establishment, cited the underlying ARA research very differently.

It reported 65.6 percent favoring reforms while remaining within the framework of the Islamic Republic and overall support for the political system at 58.9 percent.

Same country.

Apparently overlapping data.

Completely different story.

And that may be the best illustration of the problem.

The crucial group is the people who want "fundamental reform."

Opposition advocates can count them as evidence that the system has lost legitimacy.

Regime advocates can count them as people who want to preserve the system while fixing it.

Neither interpretation automatically tells us what those people would do if genuinely given a choice.

But Iran clearly isn't happy

None of this means the Islamic Republic enjoys broad public satisfaction.

Evidence for enormous discontent is considerably stronger than evidence for any particular political replacement.

Official turnout in Iran's March 2024 parliamentary election fell to about 41 percent, the lowest since the Islamic Revolution.

A leaked survey reportedly conducted by Iran's own ISPA for the presidential office put dissatisfaction with conditions in the country at 92 percent.

Official Iranian research has documented a dramatic decline in support for compulsory hijab.

Another leaked government values survey reportedly found 72.9 percent favoring separation between religion and the state.

Then came the massive protests and extraordinary repression of January 2026.

Whatever exact death toll eventually proves correct, the state's response, mass arrests and prolonged internet shutdown demonstrated the scale of the threat Tehran believed it faced.

There is also remarkable evidence that many Iranians reject core elements of the regime's ideology.

GAMAAN found 62 percent opposing the slogan "Death to Israel." Its earlier research found 69 percent saying the Islamic Republic should stop calling for Israel's destruction.

Israel's own Foreign Ministry secretly commissioned Ipsos to telephone 1,003 Iranians during the 2022 protests. Respondents were not told Israel was behind the survey.

It reportedly found 83 percent saying the government imposed religion excessively and 86 percent opposing Iranian funding for Hezbollah and Hamas.

The evidence that huge numbers of Iranians want change is overwhelming.

The question is what "change" means.

The Iranian opposition doesn't actually agree on Iran

This is where the picture presented outside Iran becomes even more misleading.

There isn't one Iranian opposition.

There are monarchists who see Reza Pahlavi as the natural figure around whom a post Islamic Republic Iran could unite.

There are secular republicans who oppose both clerical rule and restoration of the monarchy.

There are reformists who want profound change without destroying the state.

There is the MEK and its political umbrella, the NCRI, which presents itself as a government in waiting while bitterly opposing both the Islamic Republic and the Pahlavis.

There are Kurdish political movements.

There are Baloch activists.

There are Ahwazi Arab groups, including explicitly separatist organizations.

There are Azerbaijani movements ranging from demands for greater cultural and linguistic rights to federalism and outright separatism.

They aren't interchangeable.

And they certainly don't all want the same Iran.

No, Iran's minorities don't simply want to break the country apart

This matters because ethnic unrest is sometimes presented abroad as evidence that Iran is waiting to fragment once Tehran loses control.

The evidence doesn't support such a sweeping conclusion.

Kurdish opposition groups have advocated federalism and greater autonomy, but federalism isn't independence.

Baloch grievances against Tehran are enormous, particularly concerning Sunni rights and political discrimination, but opposition to Tehran doesn't automatically mean support for an independent Balochistan.

Some Ahwazi Arab organizations explicitly advocate separation.

Azerbaijani activism is particularly complicated, ranging from cultural rights to separatism, with outside actors frequently accused of encouraging the latter. Academic research has found many of those foreign sponsorship claims difficult to substantiate.

GAMAAN's provincial results also show meaningful regional differences. Pahlavi, for example, performed far worse in Kurdistan than in several predominantly Persian regions.

Yet one of GAMAAN's strongest results in 2026 went in another direction entirely.

Ninety four percent agreed with the slogan "Long Live Iran."

The evidence supports ethnic grievances, demands for decentralization and the existence of separatist movements.

It does not establish that Iran's ethnic minorities generally want Iran dismantled.

What about Reza Pahlavi?

Pahlavi is probably the most recognizable individual opposition figure.

That statement is defensible.

Saying most Iranians support him isn't.

GAMAAN's 2026 research put his consistently positive rating at approximately 45 percent, against 28 percent consistently negative.

That's impressive.

It isn't a majority.

Monarchy itself received 34 percent when respondents were asked about their preferred political system. A republic received 28 percent, the Islamic Republic 13 percent, while roughly a quarter either didn't care about the form of the alternative or didn't know enough to choose.

Pro monarchist slogans performed better. Sixty seven percent agreed with "Reza Shah, bless your soul," while 54 percent agreed with "Long Live the Shah."

But a protest slogan isn't necessarily a constitutional preference.

"Reza Shah, bless your soul" can simultaneously express nostalgia, nationalism and contempt for the clerics without meaning the person shouting it has decided how Iran's next constitution should work.

Pahlavi's own stated position is also more complicated than the shorthand description of a man seeking his father's throne.

He has publicly advocated a secular democratic transition followed by a constituent process and referendum in which Iranians would decide their future system, including monarchy or republic.

His critics question his movement's organization and intentions, while his supporters increasingly treat him as the obvious transition leader.

What can actually be demonstrated is narrower.

Pahlavi has significant support.

He appears capable of mobilizing people.

There is no reliable evidence that a majority of Iranians have chosen either him or monarchy.

The diaspora is not Iran either

This distinction becomes even more important outside the country.

Spend enough time watching Iranian opposition demonstrations in Europe or North America and you could easily conclude that the Iranian diaspora is overwhelmingly monarchist.

Available polling suggests otherwise.

A 2025 PAAIA survey of Iranian Americans found 55 percent preferring a parliamentary democracy or republic.

Only 17 percent chose constitutional monarchy.

Six percent preferred a reformed Islamic Republic and 3 percent the existing system.

That survey measures Iranian Americans, not the global diaspora, and shouldn't be stretched further.

But it demonstrates the central problem.

Visibility isn't representativeness.

The loudest people at demonstrations aren't necessarily the median Iranian emigrant.

And emigrants aren't necessarily representative of the roughly 90 million people who remained behind.

The same problem applies to pro Israel Iranians

Israelis increasingly encounter Iranians online waving the pre revolution lion and sun flag, addressing Israelis as friends and promising that the two countries will become allies once the Islamic Republic disappears.

Some of that sentiment is unquestionably genuine.

But how widespread is it?

Nobody can currently answer that confidently.

There is strong evidence that many Iranians reject their government's obsessive hostility toward Israel.

That's different from supporting Israel.

GAMAAN's 2025 research found 39 percent with a positive opinion of Israel and 48 percent with a negative one.

Fifty seven percent agreed to some degree that many Israeli actions in Gaza could be considered war crimes.

During the war, 29.9 percent reported anger toward Israel.

Its 2026 survey found 51 percent viewing Netanyahu positively, an extraordinary number in an enemy country, but the result was highly polarized.

Meanwhile, 62 percent rejected "Death to Israel."

These findings aren't contradictory.

An Iranian can hate the Islamic Republic, oppose Hamas and Hezbollah, want relations with Israel, dislike Israeli actions in Gaza and oppose Israeli bombs falling on Iran.

Human beings aren't political hashtags.

And social media makes all of this worse

There is another reason Israelis should be particularly cautious about extrapolating from Iranian social media.

The Iranians most visible to Israelis online are disproportionately likely to have internet circumvention tools, speak English or interact outside Persian language spaces, oppose government censorship and be comfortable publicly communicating with Israelis.

That's already a selection effect.

Then there is artificial amplification.

Citizen Lab researchers documented an operation known as PRISONBREAK involving more than 50 inauthentic X accounts that used fabricated material, including AI generated content, while encouraging Iranians to revolt.

Their assessment was that the hypothesis most consistent with the evidence was involvement by an unidentified Israeli government agency or a contractor working under close supervision.

That attribution remains an assessment rather than proven fact.

More importantly, it doesn't demonstrate that Iranian opposition itself is fake.

It demonstrates something narrower but highly relevant.

The online environment through which outsiders observe Iran can itself be manipulated.

The Islamic Republic runs its own information operations.

Opposition factions have their own media ecosystems.

Foreign governments broadcast into Iran.

Persian language opposition media operate from abroad.

Activists promote the information most useful to their cause.

And algorithms reward the people saying the most emotionally satisfying things.

Follow the information, not a conspiracy theory

There are legitimate questions about foreign influence.

Iran International's financing has faced years of scrutiny over reported Saudi links, which the broadcaster has denied amount to state backing.

Israel openly operates a Persian language public diplomacy apparatus aimed at Iranians.

US funded Persian broadcasting has operated for years.

Regional governments have their own interests in Iran's ethnic and political future.

Opposition organizations lobby foreign governments.

Think tanks advocate specific policies.

And the Islamic Republic itself spends enormous resources attempting to shape both domestic and international perceptions.

But we found no evidence of one coordinated campaign secretly convincing Israelis that Iranians hate their government.

The reality may be more mundane.

Different actors benefit from similar narratives.

An Israeli leader wants Iranians to believe the regime is isolated.

A monarchist wants Iranians to believe Pahlavi represents the national consensus.

The MEK wants the world to believe it represents the viable organized alternative.

A separatist movement wants its ethnic constituency to appear larger.

The Islamic Republic wants Iranians to believe opposition activists are foreign agents.

A media organization wants dramatic stories people will read.

Nobody needs to meet in a room.

They simply select the evidence most useful to them.

The Iranians we don't hear from

And this may be the biggest blind spot of all.

Imagine an older Iranian living outside Tehran.

He hates corruption.

His children can't afford housing.

He thinks compulsory hijab enforcement has gone too far.

He has no particular affection for the Supreme Leader.

He also remembers the Iran Iraq War.

He distrusts Israel and America.

He doesn't want another revolution.

He fears Syria more than he dreams of Switzerland.

He wants the government fundamentally changed but doesn't want the country collapsing around him.

Where does he appear on Israeli X?

Probably nowhere.

Yet some of the available polling suggests people occupying variations of precisely that political space may constitute an enormous part of Iranian society.

Izadi's research found 57 percent preferring gradual reform rather than regime change.

The disputed ARA research was reported as showing 65.6 percent wanting reform while remaining within the framework of the Islamic Republic.

Those figures conflict dramatically with GAMAAN.

But that's exactly the point.

The Iranian who despises the government but also fears revolution may be one of the least visible characters in the international story about Iran.

So might the religious conservative who wants less corruption but more religion.

The rural family dependent on state institutions.

The government employed teacher who dislikes the clerics.

The Basij member who genuinely believes in the revolution.

The young nationalist who hates Khamenei but also hates Israeli airstrikes.

The Kurdish federalist who rejects both Tehran and the Shah.

The republican who marched against the government but doesn't want Pahlavi.

These people complicate the story.

So we rarely hear about them.

The Islamic Republic does have supporters

This also needs to be said clearly.

The claim that virtually nobody genuinely supports the Islamic Republic is not supported by the evidence.

How large that constituency is remains fiercely disputed.

GAMAAN puts the committed ideological core very low.

Other research puts support considerably higher.

Iran also has millions of people connected economically or institutionally to the state, including government employees and extensive Basij networks.

That doesn't make every teacher receiving a government salary a regime loyalist.

Nor does dependence prove ideological support.

But the Islamic Republic has survived for almost half a century partly because it possesses institutions, constituencies, patronage networks, religious communities and coercive organizations embedded throughout Iranian society.

Reducing all of that to "the regime versus the Iranian people" may be emotionally appealing.

It isn't serious analysis.

So what do Iranians actually want?

Here is what the evidence allows us to say.

A very large majority appear dissatisfied with how Iran is governed.

Opposition to compulsory religious enforcement is substantial.

The regime's hostility toward Israel is considerably less popular than Tehran would have outsiders believe.

Millions of Iranians have demonstrated willingness to protest despite extraordinary personal risk.

Reza Pahlavi has meaningful support and appears to be the most prominent individual opposition figure, but no reliable evidence gives him a democratic mandate from most Iranians.

Monarchism is a major political force, not an established majority.

Separatist movements exist, but there is no reliable evidence that Iran's ethnic minorities generally want the country broken apart.

Iranian opposition to the regime does not automatically mean support for Israel.

And dissatisfaction does not automatically mean support for revolution.

Most importantly, no available research allows us to state confidently what percentage of Iranians would vote to abolish the Islamic Republic tomorrow in a genuinely free referendum.

Depending on which serious research you choose, Iran can look like a country in which the overwhelming majority has rejected the system or one in which almost half still supports it.

That is not a small polling discrepancy.

It is the difference between two fundamentally different countries.

Maybe the question itself is wrong

Perhaps we've spent too much time asking whether "the Iranian people" support the regime.

Ninety million people don't have one opinion.

Iran contains secular revolutionaries and religious conservatives, monarchists and republicans, Persian nationalists and Kurdish federalists, people who want foreign intervention and people terrified by it, people who admire Israel and people who despise it.

The Islamic Republic's great propaganda trick is to claim all those people support the revolution.

Its opponents risk making the mirror image mistake by claiming virtually all of them are waiting for liberation.

Neither side has proved it.

There is compelling evidence of a society exhausted by its government and demanding change.

There is much weaker evidence about what that society would build if it were finally free to choose.

Until Iranians can answer that question openly, without censorship, fear, war, exile, VPN sampling or somebody else interpreting their answers for them, perhaps the most accurate thing outsiders can say about what Iran really wants is something rarely heard in discussions about the country:

We don't know yet.