Europe Must Do More for Ukraine. Trump’s Approach Still Matters.

Americans are entitled to ask what commitment to Ukraine serves U.S. interests and how Europe can carry more responsibility. Ukrainians are entitled to worry about decisions that could leave their country less able to defend itself. A serious policy has to answer both concerns.

The argument becomes less useful when it turns into a loyalty test. Calling Donald Trump “Putin’s dog” substitutes an insult for scrutiny. Treating every criticism of his Ukraine policy as hostility toward America is equally unhelpful. The question is what his decisions achieve, what Europe contributes and whether Vladimir Putin has a stronger reason to negotiate than to keep fighting.

Russia launched the full scale invasion. Ukraine is defending its country. Acknowledging that does not settle every argument about aid, sanctions or negotiations, but it establishes where responsibility for the war belongs.

Europe’s responsibility starts with an honest account

The case for a stronger European role is compelling. Ukraine’s security directly affects the continent’s own security. European governments should plan, fund and produce for that reality, rather than depend on each change of administration in Washington.

But the claim that America gives everything while Europe contributes little is wrong. The European Parliament’s research service reported on October 14 that EU institutions and member states surpassed the United States in total allocated military, financial and humanitarian support in 2025. That comparison concerns allocated aid, not a claim that every promised euro has reached Ukraine.

Recognizing Europe’s contribution sharpens the demand for further action. Governments should be measured by whether they deliver the equipment Ukraine needs, finance predictable support and expand production. A large announcement cannot intercept a missile.

Nor are all headline totals equivalent. Loans, grants, weapons allocations and equipment delivered are different measures. Americans asking how their money is used deserve a proper answer. So do Europeans whose governments are making substantial commitments.

The useful argument is about the next stage of responsibility: how Europe can sustain Ukraine’s defense with less dependence on American taxpayers and election cycles.

European funding still needs American capabilities

More European money does not immediately replace American equipment.

The Kiel Institute reported in August that European donors procured at least €3 billion in military aid from U.S. defense companies during the first half of 2026. That represented roughly 30% of their military aid procured through industry. Kiel also identified Patriot air defense as a capability for which Europe currently has limited alternatives.

This creates a practical opportunity. Europeans can finance more of Ukraine’s requirements, including purchases of American systems, while Washington preserves access to equipment and supply chains. Over time, Europe should develop greater capacity of its own.

European financing paired with continued American supply would reduce the burden on U.S. taxpayers while preserving capabilities Ukraine still needs. It would also give Europe time to build the production capacity required for greater independence.

Europe should carry more of the cost. The transition should strengthen Ukraine’s defenses as it proceeds.

Diplomacy deserves a chance and a test

Trump should be judged fairly for trying to negotiate an end to the war. Talking to Putin does not itself amount to endorsing him. Diplomacy often requires dealing with leaders whose conduct makes negotiations difficult and necessary.

On October 16, Trump waived specified new sanctions and tariffs under the Graham Act, invoking the national interest. The order left existing sanctions under earlier Russia-related executive orders in place. Describing the decision as the removal of all American sanctions would be inaccurate.

Ukraine’s concern is whether relief for Moscow and pressure on Kyiv will produce reciprocal Russian action, or leave the defending country negotiating from a weaker position.

The question is what the flexibility secures. A concession can be a useful negotiating tool when it purchases reciprocal action. It becomes harder to defend if Moscow benefits while its demands remain unchanged.

There has been a diplomatic opening. After Steve Witkoff met Putin on October 21, the Kremlin said Russia was prepared to resume technical talks with Ukraine and the United States on or after November 10. Russia also released detained American Stephen Hubbard. Those developments deserve acknowledgment. They do not establish that a ceasefire or settlement has been achieved.

Trump’s supporters can reasonably point to the value of keeping negotiations alive. Ukraine’s supporters can reasonably ask what enforceable commitments will emerge. The next test should be concrete: reciprocal restraint, credible security arrangements and consequences if an agreement is broken.

Renewed talks create an opportunity. Their strategic value depends on what follows.

Respecting voters and respecting Ukraine

An American voter does not owe anyone an apology for asking how much the United States should spend, what the objective is or why wealthy allies cannot assume more responsibility. Those questions belong in democratic debate.

A Ukrainian does not owe anyone an apology for fearing a settlement that leaves the country exposed to another attack. Wanting negotiations to succeed does not require accepting any terms presented as peace.

For Washington, the strongest position would combine greater European financing with a clear account of what Russia must do in return for relief. For Europe, leadership should mean dependable procurement and delivery schedules, backed by the capacity to sustain them. Ukraine must be central to negotiations about its territory and future security. Decisions about its future should not be imposed over its objections.

That offers a workable basis for agreement among people who disagree about Trump: make American support more sustainable, raise Europe’s ability to defend its own security and judge negotiations by the commitments they produce.

The standard should remain the same whoever occupies the White House: can Ukraine defend itself, does Russia face a cost for continued aggression and would an agreement make another war less likely?

A stronger European role and effective American diplomacy should advance all three.